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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
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3	ALVIN L. BRAGG, JR., in his official capacity as District Attorney for New York County,	
5	Plaintiff,	
6	V •	23 Civ. 3032 (MKV)
7	JIM JORDAN, in his official capacity as Chairman of the	
8	Committee on the Judiciary; COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF	
9	THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; and MARK F.	
10	POMERANTZ,	
11	Defendants.	Oral Argument
12		<del></del>
13		New York, N.Y. April 19, 2023 2:00 p.m.
14	Before:	
15	HON. MARY	KAY VYSKOCIL,
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17		District Judge
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favor this relief.

1 (Case called; appearances noted) 2 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 3 All right. We're here for argument on plaintiff Alvin 4 Bragg's application for an injunction with respect to the 5 subpoena issued by the House Judiciary Committee. 6 Will I be hearing from you first, Mr. Boutrous? 7 MR. BOUTROUS: Yes, your Honor. Thank you. 8 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 9 And by the way, I'm just going to remind people that I 10 am going to strictly enforce the time limits that we talked to 11 the parties about in advance. Ms. Dempsey is going to keep 12 track of the time. Obviously there are some time sensitivities 13 here, and we need to be efficient with the use of time, so 14 please bear that in mind. 15 MR. BOUTROUS: Thank you very much, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Thank you. 17 MR. BOUTROUS: Thank you. And may it please the Court, your Honor? 18 This Court should grant a temporary restraining order 19 20 and injunction precluding enforcement of this subpoena, which 21 raises serious federalism issues, separation of powers issues, 22 and would cause irreparable harm to the district attorney and 23 the state of New York if it is allowed to go forward. We also 24 believe that the public interest and the equities strongly

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you at the outset,
Mr. Boutrous -- I know I received letters from two sets of
amici; everybody keeps throwing around separation of powers -aren't we really talking before federalism, not separation of
powers here?

MR. BOUTROUS: Your Honor, it's a really interesting point because, here, I think separation of powers comes into play in two senses. Courts have, the D.C. Circuit and others, talked about federalism raising what's a form of vertical separation of powers. It's a separation of the powers of federal and state governments.

THE COURT: Courts have said that or --

MR. BOUTROUS: Yes.

THE COURT: -- academics?

MR. BOUTROUS: The D.C. Circuit has said it, and we cited a D.C. Circuit case on this point, your Honor.

And then in terms of separation of powers, we have Congress seeking to superintend the executive branch of New York, the D.A. Bragg, and the judicial proceedings pending before Judge Merchan.

THE COURT: How? How does the subpoena in any way supersede the proceeding in the criminal case that's been brought by the D.A.?

MR. BOUTROUS: It doesn't supersede it, your Honor; it superintends. It oversees that proceeding. That has been

1 | the --

THE COURT: Hold on a second.

MR. BOUTROUS: Yes.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Go ahead.

MR. BOUTROUS: Thank you, your Honor.

Chairman Jordan has been very clear. In his letter to Mr. Pomerantz, he said nine times that the subpoena's purpose was to conduct oversight over Attorney Bragg.

THE COURT: He's talking generically about Congress having oversight responsibility, and then he lays out three, as I read the letter, different legislative purposes for the subpoena.

MR. BOUTROUS: Only after the fact, your Honor. First, he doesn't talk about general oversight. He says that they want to investigate whether attorney general Bragg, District Attorney Bragg is proceeding with political motivation.

THE COURT: He wants to investigate whether federal funds are being used. Why is that not a legitimate legislative purpose for the subpoena?

MR. BOUTROUS: That one, your Honor, we gave them, the District Attorney's Office gave information to Chairman Jordan, offered to meet and confer, offered to provide additional information. Mr. Pomerantz's declaration says he has no knowledge whatsoever of federal funds.

1	THE COURT: If he has no knowledge, it'll be a short	
2	deposition.	
3	MR. BOUTROUS: Well, it would be, your Honor, perhaps	
4	if you were supervising it. But Chairman Jordan will be, and	
5	he rules on objections. He's already said that he believes	
6	there's been a waiver of all privileges that Mr. Pomerantz may	
7	have possessed as a member of the District Attorney's Office.	
8	THE COURT: Tell me, Mr. Boutrous, how does this book,	
9	which is chock-full of what Mr. Pomerantz calls insider	
10	account, how does it not disclose mental impressions,	
11	deliberations of the office, the internal workings of the	
12	D.A.'s office? How is there not a waiver?	
13	MR. BOUTROUS: Your Honor, the District Attorney's	
14	Office did not waive anything in fact, objected and asked	
15	for pre-publication review.	
16	THE COURT: And he said no, right?	
17	MR. BOUTROUS: He said no.	
18	THE COURT: And what steps did the D.A.'s office take	
19	to preserve its privilege?	
20	MR. BOUTROUS: I'll let Ms. Dubeck give the Court some	
21	information.	
22	THE COURT: OK. We can defer that if you want.	
23	MR. BOUTROUS: Yes.	
24	THE COURT: I don't want to interrupt.	
25	MR. BOUTROUS: I'll let Ms. Dubeck address it, because	

a number of significant steps were taken.

But your Honor, here, in *Mazars*, the Supreme Court said that the court did not have to blind itself to what everyone can see. Chairman Jordan, Chairman Comer of another committee, the speaker of the house have all made clear that this subpoena is part of a targeted effort to intrude on the sovereignty of New York, to intimidate District Attorney Bragg.

THE COURT: That's your interpretation of it. I'm quite certain Congress never used those terms -- quite certain.

MR. BOUTROUS: Well, they didn't use "intimidate," your Honor.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. BOUTROUS: But the speaker of the house said we are going to hold the district attorney to account and hold him accountable. The speaker of the house unleashed investigations specifically regarding the district attorney. It's never been clear — and I hear your Honor. We don't have to read their minds. They've been very, very explicit.

THE COURT: In fact, doesn't the case law all say that I shouldn't try to read the minds of either side here?

MR. BOUTROUS: Exactly, your Honor.

THE COURT: If there's a valid legislative purpose, that's the end of the inquiry, right?

MR. BOUTROUS: No, your Honor. Here -- well, first let me address that.

1 THE COURT: Yes. 2 MR. BOUTROUS: On the reading of the minds, the Court 3 does not have to do that here. I don't think there's probably 4 been in history a more explicit, repeated expression of 5 improper legislative purposes. For them to supervise, to interrogate -- as you know, your Honor, they sought information 6 7 from the district attorney himself, wanted to take his deposition. They haven't given that up. 8 9 THE COURT: That's not what we're here on today. 10 MR. BOUTROUS: I totally understand, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Right? 12 MR. BOUTROUS: But this is an ongoing criminal 13 prosecution, and they want information about it, about the 14 investigations. 15 Yes. Let me go back to the book, your Honor. THE COURT: It's hard to avoid it. 16 17 MR. BOUTROUS: I know. 18 THE COURT: Isn't it, Mr. Boutrous? 19 MR. BOUTROUS: I knew you were going to ask me about 20 it. 21 THE COURT: Well? 22 MR. BOUTROUS: And let me explain. 23 First of all, they've got the book. So why do they 24 need Mr. Pomerantz? 25 THE COURT: Look, you're a very experienced litigator,

Mr. Boutrous. You know full well that just because someone has some information doesn't mean that they're not allowed to inquire further in the manner in which they wish to inquire.

And in fact, with respect to congressional subpoenas, that's what the cases say. It's not for the courts to tell Congress, if it's about a subpoena, how to conduct an inquiry.

MR. BOUTROUS: Two things, your Honor.

First, the Supreme Court's *Mazars* decision really changed the landscape. It didn't get as much play when it came out in terms of its significance. It does say that the courts can tell Congress the scope of their subpoena.

THE COURT: Justice Roberts, at the very beginning of his opinion in *Mazars*, talks about the fact that that subpoena in that case set up a clash between Congress and the President, two political branches. We are talking separation of powers there, and he says, "that distinctive aspect necessarily informs our analysis of the question before us."

MR. BOUTROUS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Which is not what we have here.

MR. BOUTROUS: I think we have at least as weighty concerns. The federalism concerns, you have the federal Congress jumping in and haranguing the district attorney when the prosecution is ongoing, and that is a blatant federalism violation. The other separation of powers, your Honor —

THE COURT: That's a different issue, though, of

whether the subpoena has a valid legislative purpose and whether I have any power to interfere with a congressional investigation. There's politics going on on both sides here. Let's be honest about that.

MR. BOUTROUS: I don't concede that there's politics going on on the district attorney's side, your Honor, but let me address --

THE COURT: Mr. Boutrous, what did half of the pictures and allegations in your complaint have to do with the subpoena?

MR. BOUTROUS: Well, they were --

THE COURT: That's rhetorical.

MR. BOUTROUS: Yes. I mean it was President Trump and the chairman.

THE COURT: Yes, which had nothing to do with the subpoena before me or the issue I need to decide.

MR. BOUTROUS: Let's put those aside, because you asked about the separation of powers.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BOUTROUS: The *Kilbourn* case that we cited was a subpoena from Congress. It was filed against members — the action was filed, and the Supreme Court held that because, there, the subpoena was regarding a pending bankruptcy proceeding, that it was a judicial act. It was inquiring about an ongoing proceeding, and the court held that was —

THE COURT: In federal court. You had Congress and the federal judiciary, so there you do have a separation-of-powers question.

MR. BOUTROUS: But the question was was it a legislative or judicial act? The Supreme Court said because it was an invasion of an ongoing matter, it was a judicial act.

THE COURT: With no validly stated legislative purpose.

MR. BOUTROUS: Well, here, your Honor, they have stated their purpose.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BOUTROUS: And they pin these other specious purposes that they claim they're seeking. The Alvin act, your Honor, we cited in our reply which we submitted yesterday.

THE COURT: They cited it too, I think.

MR. BOUTROUS: They cited.

THE COURT: Isn't that proof that they are, in fact, considering legislation going to some of these issues?

MR. BOUTROUS: No, your Honor. And in fact, the Alvin act --

THE COURT: How is it not?

MR. BOUTROUS: But let's take them at their word, that they are going to consider the Alvin act, which I find to be a rather disrespectful name, but let me give you the -- it's a bill of attainder. It's specifically directed solely at this

district attorney to punish him.

THE COURT: Yes, but Mr. Boutrous, what you're doing now is you're arguing about what would be the validity or maybe even the constitutionality of the act should it be enacted into law. And I'm not permitted, under the long line of cases, including Mazars, to look at what would be the ultimate constitutionality of legislation that Congress may or may not pass.

MR. BOUTROUS: Totally agree, your Honor. But *Mazars* does give you much more leeway, and here's why. It holds that even if they do articulate an ostensible proper purpose, then the Court applies the four-part test in *Mazars*.

THE COURT: It says on the facts of *Mazars*, where you have executive privilege implicated or where you have the executive office implicated. These are four considerations that I might or a court might want to take into account, and it goes on to say there may be others.

MR. BOUTROUS: However, your Honor, by the time it went back to the D.C. Circuit, it was former President Trump.

THE COURT: I understand.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  BOUTROUS: And here, we have former President Trump's information.

THE COURT: No. Here, we have Mr. Pomerantz, for whom I have tremendous respect, but Mr. Pomerantz is a lay citizen, and the case law is abundantly clear that all citizens have a

duty to comply with subpoenas.

MR. BOUTROUS: Not if they're not permissible, your Honor.

THE COURT: But now you're going back to the question about whether there's a valid legislative purpose.

MR. BOUTROUS: And if I may, your Honor? Could I just walk through the *Mazars* factors to give you a sense --

THE COURT: Go ahead. Sure.

MR. BOUTROUS: Because I do think the Supreme Court said the rationale of *Mazars* is that where you have a clash between rival branches, which the state of New York is a branch of government --

THE COURT: It's not a branch of the federal government, which is what Mazars is about.

MR. BOUTROUS: It is in that specific instance, but the underlying purposes, your Honor, I am confident if the Supreme Court looked at this situation, it would say that invading a state, the principles of federalism -- just like separation of powers -- protect liberty, protect against excessive abuse of power, protect it against the federal Congress coming in and acting like a federal court -- under their absolute immunity theory, they could subpoena the trial judge. They could subpoena you, and there's nothing you could do.

THE COURT: Well, now that you're talking about that

immunity theory, you didn't address in your opening brief the speech or debate clause, which is front and center in most of the jurisprudence on these types of debates. How can you prove a likelihood of success on the merits — which is part of your burden, right?

MR. BOUTROUS: Yes.

THE COURT: How can you prove that when, under the speech or debate clause, there is immunity? You don't dispute that there's immunity, do you?

MR. BOUTROUS: Your Honor, we do dispute it, your Honor, because there's not a proper legislative purpose. And under *Mazars* -- I'm going to stick with this, your Honor; I think it's absolutely correct -- it requires a heightened scrutiny because of this clash.

THE COURT: I understand your position on *Mazars*, but my question is on the speech or debate clause, which says nothing about -- it says that members of the House shall not be questioned in any place, and that has been broadly interpreted to mean they're immune from suit -- not just from liability, from suit.

MR. BOUTROUS: Your Honor, I think that under the new approach in *Mazars* in particular, that is called into question.

THE COURT: Where? Where in *Mazars* is that called into question?

MR. BOUTROUS: Well, in that case, your Honor, they

originally sued -- President Trump sued the chairman of the committee, and the Congress intervened as a defendant.

THE COURT: They chose to waive their immunity.

MR. BOUTROUS: They seemingly did.

THE COURT: Well, they can do that, right, just like you can waive the privilege?

MR. BOUTROUS: Which we did not do, but the fact that they came in as a defendant in a lawsuit, under their theory, it would have meant they should have sought to dismiss it.

Instead, it went to the Supreme Court; it came back to the D.C. Circuit.

And your Honor, if I may?

The reason we didn't address it at the beginning is they have often not raised the issue.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. BOUTROUS: And so now they have, but they rely heavily on the *Eastland* case, and your Honor, the *Eastland* case was exactly our circumstance. A third party who was not subpoenaed sued their bank and Senator Eastland and some other senators. The Supreme Court, in footnote 14, made clear that the district court properly entertained the action to determine whether there was a proper legislative purpose, which is exactly what we're asking you to do and also to layer on the *Mazars* standard.

THE COURT: Do you win even if I reject your argument

on *Mazars*?

MR. BOUTROUS: I think we still do, your Honor, because I think this invading a judicial proceeding, whether in state or federal court, is a judicial act.

The *Plaut* case that we cited, Justice Scalia, from the court, even though a statute was passed, the court held that it was more akin to a judicial act and violated the separation of powers. And I know the Court is pointing to the difference between the federal and state schemes, but it's really a triple whammy. Congress is seeking to invade the executive branch of New York, the D.A.

THE COURT: How? How?

MR. BOUTROUS: By seeking to hold him to account in an ongoing prosecution.

THE COURT: He's seeking information in a deposition.

MR. BOUTROUS: I'm quoting the speaker of the House, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm talking about the subpoena. That's what's in front of me, not all the political rhetoric that's been flying back and forth.

MR. BOUTROUS: I understand.

THE COURT: That's all color. It's all theater, but it's not what's in front of me.

MR. BOUTROUS: Well, what's also in front of your Honor is the letter from the chairman of the judiciary

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committee that accompanied the subpoena --
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               THE COURT: Yes.
               MR. BOUTROUS: -- where it said over and over it's not
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      just oversight of the general system, it's oversight of this
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     prosecution. He wants to know about the internal deliberations
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      of the prosecutors.
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               THE COURT: Because he says it's been waived in this
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      book.
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               MR. BOUTROUS: Let me go back.
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               THE COURT: You said Ms. Dubeck is going to address
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      that.
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               MR. BOUTROUS: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Are you going to do it now --
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               MR. BOUTROUS: I could.
               THE COURT: -- or in the rebuttal?
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               MR. BOUTROUS: How much time do I have left?
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               THE DEPUTY CLERK: Five minutes.
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               MR. BOUTROUS: Perfect.
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               Mr. Wells has also given us his five minutes.
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               THE COURT: So you're not going to argue at all,
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     Mr. Wells?
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               MR. WELLS:
                          No, your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           OK.
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               MS. DUBECK: Good afternoon.
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               THE COURT: Hold on.
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               Are you doing that now?
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               MR. BOUTROUS: Pardon me?
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               THE COURT: In other words, you're doing 25?
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               MR. BOUTROUS: Yes, please.
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               THE COURT: OK.
               MR. BOUTROUS: Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Thank you.
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               Ms. Dubeck.
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               MS. DUBECK: The irreparable harm here is to the
      independent prosecutors and the chilling of prosecutorial
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      decisions. Due process depends on the independence of
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     prosecutors and is reflected in multiple doctrines -- grand
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      jury secrecy -- and absolute immunity is given to prosecutors.
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               THE COURT: The question that I was asking you about
      is how has that not been waived in this book?
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               MS. DUBECK: Sure.
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               Those doctrines, those privileges and the confidences
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      belong to my office and not to Mr. Pomerantz as a former member
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      of the office. We took steps upon learning of the book to be
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      published to alert Mr. Pomerantz to just remind him of his
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      obligations to keep our confidences. He made a public
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      statement assuring the public that he -- that the book was
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      complying with his confidences.
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               THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. Have you read
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      this book?
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MS. DUBECK: Yes.

THE COURT: Does it preserve your confidences?

MS. DUBECK: No. I think there are things contained in there that should not have been published and that expose Mr. Pomerantz to criminal liability under the city charter.

THE COURT: And have you taken any actions to enjoin distribution of the book? Did you take any action to enjoin its publication before it got published? Did you do anything --

MS. DUBECK: Yes.

THE COURT: -- with respect to your statement that you just made -- that he has waived your privileges?

MS. DUBECK: He has not waived our privileges because they were unauthorized disclosures. We have taken steps. We did not seek to -- we did not think that we could succeed in a case of prior restraint because we did not have a copy of the book to know what he was going to be saying, and he represented that he was not violating any of the confidences.

THE COURT: He represents that in the book, I will say.

MS. DUBECK: Moreover, at the time the book was published, the proceeding that we were trying to protect was confidential, and we had a legal obligation to maintain the grand jury's secrecy. We tried to navigate that as best we could by sending the letter. At the time we sent the letter,

which was within a week of the announcement that the book would be published and a month before the book was published, we cc'd the letter to the department of investigation, which is the city department with civil and criminal jurisdiction to investigate the breaches of confidentiality that we identified as plausibly going to occur. That's the most we could say before we had read the book.

The city charter provisions I'm referring to 2604(d)(6) and 2606(c). That latter provision makes it a misdemeanor to violate 2604(d)(6), which says a former employee may not disclose confidential information obtained as an employee.

Mr. Pomerantz would be exposed to misdemeanor liability if he answered questions about the work that he did in the office that is not otherwise available to the public.

THE COURT: Well, he's already exposed to that then, you're saying, right?

MS. DUBECK: I think he is, and I think if he says any words that are different or in addition to what has been written in the book, he is further exposing himself to criminal liability. And I think it's clear that the committee is not planning to just ask him to authenticate the book but is, in fact, asking for more information like what he has put in the book, and that is why we think there is an irreparable harm with going forward with the deposition, because the House rules

say that no government attorney can attend the deposition; that the Chairman will make any rulings on the privilege; and that the rules can't promise confidentiality; that the interview would be available to the committee and if the committee decides it would be available to the Congress and the public.

What they haven't done is identified any reason that the deposition needs to happen tomorrow. They haven't identified any reason why they and I can't talk about the ability — whether there is information that we could provide that would assist them without raising the concerns that we have about prosecutorial independence and the feeling that what they are trying to do is chill our actions rather than conduct oversight of how our office spent \$5,000 of federal forfeiture funds.

THE COURT: But you did admittedly do that, right?

MS. DUBECK: Yes.

THE COURT: Why is that not a valid legislative purpose — to look into that, to better understand how it was spent and to explore whether there's legislation that might be appropriate to address that?

MS. DUBECK: My last letter to the committee -
THE COURT: My question is is that a valid legislative purpose, or why is it not?

MS. DUBECK: I think there is a valid legislative purpose to looking at how federal funds are spent. I don't

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think that this case can be a case study for them in 1 2 investigating that, and there is information that we have 3 offered to provide them, that we said we would provide on 4 request, but they never followed up to ask for it. 5 THE COURT: But the problem is you just conceded 6 there's a valid legislative purpose here, and once that's true, 7 it's not my role, under all the case law, to tell them what and how they ought to conduct their inquiry. Right? 8 9 MS. DUBECK: If the Court were to limit the subpoena 10 to a discussion of federal funding --11 THE COURT: They've asserted other purposes too. 12 MS. DUBECK: Well, I don't concede that those are 13 legislative or appropriate. 14 THE COURT: You want to switch off again? 15 MR. BOUTROUS: We're going to switch again, your 16 Honor. 17 THE COURT: OK. 18 MR. BOUTROUS: Your Honor, just back to the legislative purpose, the first sentence of Chairman Jordan's 19 20 April 6 letter, which is part of exhibit 1 --21 THE COURT: Hold on one minute. Let me pull it out --22 MR. BOUTROUS: Yes. 23 THE COURT: -- because I flagged it myself. 24 give me one moment.

Go ahead.

All right.

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purpose legitimate.

MR. BOUTROUS: The first sentence is unequivocal. Ιt says, the Committee on the Judiciary is conducting oversight of the New York County district attorney's unprecedented indictment of a former President of the United States. THE COURT: But that's not the subpoena. MR. BOUTROUS: The subpoena doesn't say anything, your It's an open-ended license. Honor. THE COURT: I have it. MR. BOUTROUS: I know, your Honor. THE COURT: It's not an open ended license. subpoena specifically touching on matters of inquiry committed to said committee or subcommittee. That's meaningless, your Honor. MR. BOUTROUS: THE COURT: It may be. MR. BOUTROUS: It's meaningless. THE COURT: But your cocounsel has just conceded that the letter asserts a valid legislative purpose. MR. BOUTROUS: But your Honor, think about it this If someone came -- declared that their real, their purpose is to conduct oversight of an ongoing criminal prosecution -- and that's improper -- and then they toss in a bunch of other things, that doesn't make the fundamental

THE COURT: You're saying that's the fundamental purpose. They have said in their briefing that there are three

valid legislative purposes, one of which you've just conceded is valid.

MR. BOUTROUS: Those are the  $post\ hoc$  rationalizations of lawyers.

THE COURT: That's your characterization of it, and the cases tell me if I find a valid legislative purpose, I am not allowed to look at the motivations on either side.

MR. BOUTROUS: Your Honor, I don't think that -- again, back to *Mazars*, *Mazars* said that you look at the evidence of -- even if they articulate purposes. There's no evidence.

THE COURT: There is evidence. You've sent a letter conceding that you used \$5,000 of federal forfeiture funds in connection with the investigation.

MR. BOUTROUS: Not in connection with the investigation of President Trump that resulted in the indictment. And that's what they supposedly are investigating.

Watkins, your Honor, says that the purpose --

THE COURT: You're saying that's what they're investigating. They say they're investigating the use of federal funds.

MR. BOUTROUS: They say they are investigating -- they are conducting oversight of the D.A.'s office, your Honor. They can't get around that. I'm not sort of speculating.

THE COURT: But you can't get around that they also

say they want to investigate the use of federal funds, and your cocounsel has just conceded that would be a valid legislative purpose.

MR. BOUTROUS: But several cases, including one that they cite — the McPhaul case says that if the subpoena is irrelevant to or has no connection to the supposed asserted purpose, then it's not proper. Watkins says it can't be a flimsy relationship. This is a — your Honor, again, what the Supreme Court said holds. This Court does not have to blind itself to what we can all see and what the Chairman said.

The last point I'll make before I sit down, leaving some time for rebuttal, is, the Court asked about --

THE COURT: I'm sorry.

MR. BOUTROUS: If the Court were to conclude --

THE COURT: The Court asked?

MR. BOUTROUS: On the immunity point.

THE COURT: Oh, yes. Thank you.

MR. BOUTROUS: So, if the Court right now is thinking that we're not likely to succeed on the immunity issue, then we still can proceed. The Rule 19 indispensable party argument is novel. It's not supported by anything.

THE COURT: It's supported by the federal rules, they say.

MR. BOUTROUS: It's not, because --

THE COURT: So are you proposing we should let this

lawsuit go forward with your client, the D.A.'s office, as the plaintiff and Mr. Pomerantz as the defendant?

MR. BOUTROUS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And Mr. Pomerantz has publicly stated he will take his instructions from your office.

MR. BOUTROUS: Yes.

THE COURT: So we should have a lawsuit between two parties, one of whom is following the instructions of the other party?

MR. BOUTROUS: Well, it's three parties -- four parties now, or more.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BOUTROUS: Well, two of them don't want to participate. They can make their arguments.

THE COURT: Two of them are saying they have immunity, and you have, therefore, a problem with likelihood of success on the merits. That's what they've said so far.

MR. BOUTROUS: They've expressed their views on the merits. They've participated. They could file an amicus brief, like they did in the Bannon case. They could file and intervene back in, like they did in Mazars.

THE COURT: How are they not a necessary party when they're the ones that have served the subpoena that you're seeking to enjoin?

MR. BOUTROUS: We can get adequate relief without

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them, and they could protect their interests.

In contempt actions, like Watkins, your Honor,
Congress isn't a party to that and their interests are well
represented and they're not an indispensable party.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BOUTROUS: With that, I'll reserve.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Boutrous.

MR. BOUTROUS: Thank you.

THE COURT: I will hear, then, from counsel for the committee.

Mr. Berry, right?

MR. BERRY: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BERRY: Thank you, your Honor.

May it please the Court?

Setting aside the hyperbole and the rhetoric, this motion is about a single-deposition subpoena issued by the House Judiciary Committee to Mr. Pomerantz.

THE COURT: All right. But Mr. Berry, what do you say about Mr. Boutrous's accurate argument that the first line of the cover letter accompanying the subpoena says that you're asserting oversight over the district attorney's -- let me find the exact wording -- conducting oversight of the New York County district attorney's unprecedented indictment of a former President of the United States and current declared candidate

for that office.

MR. BERRY: Yes, it is true.

THE COURT: How is that a valid legislative purpose?

MR. BERRY: Because we are looking into whether or not there is a problem with politically motivated prosecutions of former Presidents and politically motivated prosecutions of former Presidents using federal funds. And the federal funds legislative purpose, I think, is absolutely valid, as the plaintiffs have now conceded. What we have not discussed is the federal interest in the former Presidents.

In the Former Presidents Act of 1958, Congress recognized that the interest of the American people in the President does not cease to exist when he leaves office. He gets lifetime Secret Service protection. He gets federal office space. He gets money for staff. He gets travel funds. And the question is if you have politically motivated prosecutions or investigations of former Presidents, can that affect their conduct while in office?

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. Do you need your adjectives of "politically motivated" then if you're telling me that a valid legislative purpose is all of these protections of a President or a former President and the need to avoid interference with exercise of presidential powers while in office? Does the prosecution have to be politically motivated to implicate those concerns?

MR. BERRY: I don't think that it has to, but I

think -
THE COURT: Then why are we having all this

conversation about what the D.A.'s motives are in bringing the

case that it brought?

MR. BERRY: Because it makes the case for federal

action stronger, your Honor. If you have a situation -
THE COURT: Doesn't it politicize it on your side as

well?

MR. BERRY: I don't think so, your Honor. And if I could explain?

If you have a situation where Presidents, while they're in office, feared that because of the decisions they make while in office, state and local prosecutors around the country are going to make them target No. 1 for prosecutions, that could impact the way they conduct themselves in office. Let's say, for instance, they have something that they feel is in the national interest but it would be very unpopular in New York City. If they fear a prosecution in New York City, will they tailor their behavior in order to avoid prosecutions?

Similarly, if they fear that they're going to be subject to a prosecution in a city, will they tailor their agenda so that they will become more popular in a city, thus warranting off prosecutions and investigations?

And this is not an issue about just one person, your

Honor. There's already talk that there could be politically motivated prosecutions or investigations of the current President once he leaves office. And the idea that there's no federal interest in stopping that from happening or at least developing legislation to try to ameliorate the effects of that, I think, is something that the plaintiff has never rebutted. We've expressed this theory in letter after letter. We put it in the brief, and they've never rebutted it.

THE COURT: In all of the cases that I've looked at, including Mazars, frankly, the court never did rule on the validity of the subpoena in Mazars at the end of the day. It remanded it back, and the parties then talked to each other, like civilized professionals, and presumably they worked something out. Why can't that happen here?

MR. BERRY: So, we issued a subpoena to Mr. Pomerantz.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BERRY: The next thing that happened was that we were brought into this court. We think we're immune from this suit. We were not contacted by Mr. Pomerantz, who said, listen, I'm willing to discuss with you topics A, B and C.

THE COURT: You were or you were not?

MR. BERRY: We were not.

THE COURT: You were not.

MR. BERRY: We were not contacted by the District Attorney's Office to say OK, do you want to talk to

Mr. Pomerantz about A, B, or C. We were just brought into court. The plaintiff is asking the Court not only --

THE COURT: But as I understand it, there were attempts by the D.A.'s office to reach out to try to talk to you about the scope of the subpoena.

MR. BERRY: No.

THE COURT: Am I wrong about that?

MR. BERRY: No, the D.A.'s office has not reached out to us once to discuss the scope of the subpoena.

THE COURT: There were no letters sent to you about the timing and about the scope?

(Indiscernible overlap)

MR. BERRY: Not after the subpoena was issued, no.

THE COURT: Well, you issued the subpoena, after you tried, which may be the more appropriate way to do things; I don't know. You tried to informally get information.

Certainly there were letters back and forth then.

MR. BERRY: There were letters back and forth, and we did receive the valuable piece of information that they spent \$5,000 of federal forfeiture money on this investigation. But it's up to Congress to determine how it's going to structure its investigation. We were not getting much cooperation. We issued a subpoena, and not only did they haul us into court to try to enjoin the subpoena, which I think that this Court has no power to do, they have also asked —

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Why do I have no power to do it? THE COURT: I think that it is precluded by the speech MR. BERRY: or debate clause to the U.S. Constitution, and I think that because there's a valid legislative purpose for the subpoena --THE COURT: OK. But I do first have to determine is there or is there not a valid legislative purpose, correct? MR. BERRY: You do have to determine whether or not the subpoena, the investigation relates to topics on which legislation could be had. THE COURT: Right. MR. BERRY: Absolutely. THE COURT: OK. But we issued the subpoena. MR. BERRY: Ιf Mr. Pomerantz or the D.A.'s office wanted to have a conversation about that subpoena to try to narrow it, we could have done it. Instead, we were hauled into court not only to enjoin the subpoena, but in the complaint the plaintiff's asked me to say that preemptively we cannot issue any subpoenas to any current or former D.A.'s office employees. THE COURT: Yes, I do know that, and we didn't have a chance to talk about that, Mr. Boutrous and I or Ms. Dubeck and So perhaps on rebuttal we can talk about that, because that is certainly part of the relief sought in this lawsuit. MR. BERRY: So I think there's a valid legislative

purpose in terms of the interest of former Presidents and

federal government's interest in that. There's a federal removal bill that we cite in our brief that deals with that issue that's under consideration.

THE COURT: Is that what has been, I have to say, pejoratively referred to as the Alvin bill?

MR. BERRY: That is not the Alvin bill, your Honor. We do not cite that in our brief.

THE COURT: No, you don't.

MR. BERRY: This is a bill that was introduced by

Congress that says if you have an indictment of a former

President, it can be removed to federal court, where you could have federal judges of life tenure overseeing such prosecution.

THE COURT: So that bill has been introduced.

MR. BERRY: It is. It's cited in our brief, your Honor.

There's also a bill that would restrict the use of federal forfeiture funds in investigations of current or former Presidents or vice presidents.

THE COURT: If you've already introduced the bills, why do you need testimony then at this point?

MR. BERRY: Because for Congress to introduce them, there has to be consideration given as to whether they're necessary.

THE COURT: Don't you normally do that before you introduce something?

MR. BERRY: Congressmen introduce bills all the time. Then committees hold hearings and give deliberation in terms of whether or not this is a bill that's worthy of moving forward. There are thousands of bills that are introduced each Congress. Not all of them, and the small minority of them, make it through. So you have hearings after you've introduced bills to see whether or not they're necessary.

Your Honor, if I could also move to the *Mazars* case given how much emphasis the plaintiffs put on it, I have two points to make here.

First of all, Mazars does not implicate the speech or debate clause protection that the committee has. And in particular, I want to point your Honor to Meadows v. Pelosi.

So, you had a case about a subpoena directed to the former chief of staff of the White House, a clear executive branch-legislative branch clash. The D.C. federal district court said that Mazars had no bearing on whether or not that subpoena was protected by the speech or debate clause. So if a subpoena that was issued to the former chief of staff of the White House, and it implicates executive branch and legislative branch prerogatives, is protected by the speech or debate clause, then I think that the answer here in terms of whether or not the subpoena is protected by the speech or debate clause is the same.

THE COURT: What is your argument with respect to

speech or debate clause? Is it that they can't show likelihood of success on the merits, and therefore, I should deny the relief they're requesting?

MR. BERRY: Absolutely. I think because of the speech or debate clause they cannot show likelihood of success on the merits.

The second issue I wanted to raise with respect to

Mazars -- and I agree with much of what your Honor said

before -- is that that case depended upon the unique nature of the presidency.

THE COURT: So it your position that *Mazars* is limited to that factual context?

MR. BERRY: It is. To the extent the Supreme Court wishes to extend it, it could extend it, but I don't think the lower courts can.

The court said there the President is the only person who alone composes a branch of government. They also said the President's unique constitutional status means that Congress may not look to him as a case study for general legislation.

The uniqueness of the presidency was key to Mazars and that four-part test. It's not even clear that it would apply to the vice president of the United States, the secretary of transportation, the secretary of health and human services. I think that there is no way you can read Mazars then to say that that four-part test and heightened scrutiny applies to a

subpoena for information from a former special assistant district attorney in New York County.

THE COURT: Before you get there, do you agree that the test articulated in *Mazars* is a, quote, heightened scrutiny?

MR. BERRY: I do agree that it is more scrutiny than is given to a standard congressional subpoena. If you get past immunity problem, it is heightened scrutiny.

THE COURT: Well, what is the standard that you say should apply here?

MR. BERRY: The standard is does this investigation and this subpoena relate to a subject upon which legislation could be had? Is there a valid legislative purpose? And here, the plaintiff has already conceded one valid legislative purpose, which is the use of federal funds, is this the type of investigation where federal funds should be used, and they've really not made any serious attempt to rebut our second federal purpose about the protection and treatment of former Presidents in terms of politically motivated prosecutions and investigations, how that could impact the exercise of the office of — the exercise of the powers of the office of the President of the United States.

And this is an exceptional deferential test that courts use, as the court said in *Brewster*, in *Johnson*. The Supreme Court said don't look at motives in terms of

determining legislative purpose. So I think that in terms of the legislative purpose, we have two very strong legislative purposes that have not been rebutted.

I'd also like to talk briefly, if I may, about the privilege issues, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes. Give me one second.

Is it your position that there are just two purposes that they re invoking?

MR. BERRY: So, with respect to the subpoena of Mr. Pomerantz, we are primarily focused on the interest in the former President and the use of federal funds. There is an issue in terms of the protection of the President while he's in the criminal justice system.

THE COURT: Is that your removal point?

MR. BERRY: No. That deals with the treatment in the criminal justice system and issues about protection, and the like. I do not believe that those are of substantial relevance to this particular subpoena or this particular deposition.

THE COURT: OK.

All right. I would like to talk to you about the privilege point, so go ahead.

MR. BERRY: With respect to the privilege issues, as you pointed out, Mr. Pomerantz has written a book about the investigation of the former President. That's not all, though. He has answered questions about that work in numerous

high-profile television interviews. He's talked to 60 Minutes. He's answered questions to Rachel Maddow, Good Morning,
America, etc. Once the book came out, we're unaware of any action that the plaintiff took to try to get him to stop answering questions about this material. The only time where the plaintiff has gone to court and taken any substantive action to try to get him to stop talking is when a duly issued congressional subpoena was issued and the House Judiciary Committee wants to ask him questions about that issue.

So as I understand it, their position basically is if he wants to go on to Rachel Maddow, if he wants to star on 60 Minutes, we're going to sit on our hands and not actually do anything, but when the House Judiciary Committee wants to ask him questions about that very same topic, then we need emergency relief from the federal court.

I don't think that this is reasonable behavior if you think this is privileged material. I don't think that this is the type of behavior that this Court should countenance — that somehow the House Judiciary Committee ranks below 60 Minutes in terms of the protection of privilege or in terms of the public interest in having the material in his book discussed.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Berry, the court, in *Mazars*, said the following:

"Recipients" of a subpoena "have long been understood to retain

common law and constitutional privileges with respect to

certain materials, such as attorney-client communications and governmental communications protected by executive privilege."

MR. BERRY: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you intend to respect the invocation of privilege if this deposition were to go forward?

MR. BERRY: So, if this deposition were to go forward, this is the way it would work. Mr. Pomerantz would be asked a question. If he feels, if he would like, if he feels that a privilege should be invoked or he's been instructed to invoke the privilege, then the committee chair will make a decision on a case-by-case basis of whether to sustain that privilege. If Mr. Pomerantz is unsure whether or not a question involves a privilege — he's not being held hostage in the room — he's free to go outside the room if he wants to consult with an attorney from the D.A.'s office about whether the question implicates privilege; he can do so. Decisions are made on privilege in congressional depositions on a question-by-question basis.

Then, if it's overruled and he still refuses to answer on the basis of privilege, generally those questions are then saved for the end. At that point, Mr. Pomerantz would be free to go. The way this works then is the committee gives

Mr. Pomerantz another chance. They would write him a letter exploring the questions that they would still like answered that Mr. Pomerantz refused to answer on the basis of privilege.

He would then be able to come back and either answer the questions or make additional -- explain more why he thinks it's covered by privilege.

If he still refuses to answer, then the committee would have a decision to make. Would they try to do civil enforcement of the subpoena and require him to ask by going to court itself, where we don't have speech or debate clause relief, or would they seek to hold him in contempt, in which case there has to be a committee vote. There has to be a vote of the full House, and then that would have to be referred to the Justice Department to see if they want to go forward.

But the key question is Mr. Pomerantz, if he shows up tomorrow and invokes privilege, he's not going to be held in contempt tomorrow. He's free to present whatever privilege arguments he wants, on a question-by-question basis, and then the committee will make a decision. And I would point your Honor to the Harriet Miers case from the federal district court in 2008.

There, the former counsel to the President of the United States, not a former special assistant district attorney, said I don't want to come, I'm absolutely immune because of executive privilege, I should not be required to show up at all. And what did the federal district court there say? The federal district court said no, you do not have absolute immunity. You do not just get to say I'm not showing

up. You have to show up, but if you want to assert executive privilege in response to questions, you can do that. And Mr. Pomerantz is free to assert privileges if he shows up tomorrow with respect to particular questions. Then the committee can ask questions to elicit the basis of the privilege claims and they adjudicate them on a question-by-question basis.

What there's no precedent for, your Honor, is a court saying you do not have to show up for a congressional deposition because you intend to make some privilege claims.

THE COURT: Isn't Mr. Pomerantz, who now, unfortunately, said he doesn't wish to be heard and is being heard really by just saying I agree with what the D.A.'s office says, but in any event, isn't he being put in a little bit of a difficult position here, where either he answers your questions and potentially violates his ethical duties to the office of the district attorney, or he refuses to answer and then he faces potential contempt?

 $$\operatorname{\textsc{MR.}}$$  BERRY: I guess I would have two answers to that, your Honor.

First, people that are being deposed by Congress, it is standard that they do not get judicial review up front of their privilege claims, or the like. So if they wish to assert privilege claims and they are going to refuse to answer even if all those privilege claims are overruled, they have to rely on

judicial review at the back end, and that is not in any way unique to Mr. Pomerantz. That is anybody who shows up for a congressional deposition.

But secondly, your Honor, this is a case where there is diversity between Mr. Bragg and Mr. Pomerantz, on one side, and the committee, on the other. Mr. Pomerantz is objecting to the subpoena. He says he agrees with Mr. Bragg's arguments, and so even though they've tried to set up this formality, where Mr. Bragg is suing Mr. Pomerantz and us --

THE COURT: Yes, but under all the line of cases, he is appropriately a nominal defendant; no?

MR. BERRY: He is a nominal defendant, but he's joined in the request for relief and says he opposes the subpoena.

THE COURT: Yes, he did. Yes, he did.

MR. BERRY: So he is not a neutral third party that was referred to in the *Eastland* case. He is someone that has come in and is opposing the subpoena and objecting to it. So I think that even if one were to say that there's a special exception for neutral third parties, that doesn't apply to him anymore.

Also, with respect to Rule 19 joinder, and this is one point I wanted to make, your Honor, the Second Circuit has been clear, both in cases involving state sovereign immunity, invoked by the state of New York, and by Indian tribes in terms of their immunity, that when you look at the Rule 19(b)

factors, that if we are an indispensable party and I would
strongly argue that we are an indispensable party and if we
are immune, then the No. 1 factor in determining whether the
other claims should be dismissed as well, the other defendants,
is the immunity. And I would submit, your Honor, that if the
state of New York thinks that it is an indispensable party and
because of its sovereign immunity, claims brought by the Seneca
Nation in that case that we cited in our brief, that that
warranted dismissing the claims so that Seneca Nation could not
get relief on anything or, your Honor, if the Second Circuit
says with respect to Indian tribes and their immunity, the
overwhelming importance of that immunity overrides the other
Rule 19 factors, I would submit, your Honor, that the speech or
debate clause in congressional immunity is no less deserving of
the judiciary's respect than the state of New York's sovereign
immunity when they have made this Rule 19 argument or the
Indian tribes when they have made this argument. And so your
Honor, I think we don't even have to get to that point because
in terms of likelihood of success on the merits, this is
covered by the speech or debate clause; there's really more
than one valid legislative purpose, and also with respect to
irreparable harm, your Honor, plaintiff

THE COURT: How can they?

MR. BOUTROUS: With respect to irreparable harm,
Mr. Pomerantz has already written the book. He's already given

all these television interviews in public. It's a best-selling book, by the way; it made the top ten of the New York Times bestseller list. He's given interviews on 60 Minutes, which is the most watched news magazine in the country. He's shared all this information in public, tens of millions of people. Then the District Attorney's Office is saying if he talks about those topics in a room in the Capitol, where there will not be any reporters, and answers questions about those same topics they will somehow be irreparably harmed —

THE COURT: Is it your position there's been a waiver with respect to what has been said in the book, or are you arguing a subject matter waiver?

MR. BERRY: I think that, at a minimum, there is waiver in terms of what has been said in the book. In terms of whether or not there's been complete subject matter waiver, I think that if Mr. Pomerantz or Mr. Bragg wants to make that argument that there's not been subject matter waiver, if Mr. Pomerantz shows up at the deposition and there's a question that implicates that, that argument can be advanced and the committee would have to consider it.

I'm not authorized here to state that because that has not been brought to our attention yet.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. BOUTROUS: But where is the irreparable harm, your Honor? Mr. Pomerantz is not working to prepare for the trial

of former President Trump. All of this information is already out there, and he did not express any theory in terms of how this is imminent harm to the state of New York.

THE COURT: So you have to admit that it is somewhat unusual to, as you say in your cover letter, for Congress to exercise oversight of a local district attorney's prosecution. Is it not?

MR. BERRY: I would say that it's not the ordinary course of events. It's also not the ordinary course of events for Congress to go after the -- you know, to do many types of investigations. But what I would say is that we have shown that this is related to valid legislative purposes. And in particular, if we are concerned about, and that you think that there's a substantial federal concern in dealing with politically motivated prosecutions of former Presidents, part of an investigation into whether or not we need to take legislative steps to address that problem is looking into what's going on in terms of the investigations of former Presidents.

THE COURT: How far can you go with that without stepping on what clearly is immunity of this office to conduct its own prosecutions and investigations?

MR. BERRY: What I would say, your Honor, is that we are proceeding in a very measured, modest way. You will notice we have issued one subpoena, and that is to Mr. Pomerantz.

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Hopefully, he will cooperate and we can get information from him. I'm not authorized to nor has the committee made any decision about what it's going to do in terms of any future subpoenas. If we do issue such subpoenas and they were challenged, we would litigate about those.

But the main point I would like to make is that plaintiff wants this case and this motion to be about things other than the subpoena to Mr. Pomerantz, because I think they realize how weak their case is with respect to the subpoena of Mr. Pomerantz. That's why you have the implication of other things that are going on. You have the rhetoric and the hyperbole. I would urge your Honor to focus just on the subpoena of Mr. Pomerantz. Ask is there a subject upon which legislation could be had? Is there a valid legislative purpose? Have they shown that there will be irreparable harm for the Court to take the extraordinary step, for the first time we're aware of, of enjoining a subpoena for a congressional deposition? And I think, your Honor, if you ask yourself those questions, the Court will come to the conclusion that there is no substantial likelihood of success on the merits in this case. There is no showing of actual and imminent irreparable harm and that consistent with case after case where people have gone to court and tried to get congressional subpoenas enjoined -- whether it be Meadows v. Pelosi, whether it be the Ward case, whether it be the Freiss

case -- that this Court should decline to issue a preliminary injunction, to respect the speech or debate clause, respect legislative prerogatives, and leave other matters for other days if the committee chooses to take those steps.

And with that, I will let my learned colleague come in.

THE COURT: OK. Thank you.

MR. BOUTROUS: Thank you.

Your Honor, first, we are not seeking relief on this motion for anything other than this subpoena.

THE COURT: Right. That was one question I did have for you, Mr. Boutrous, because you do have a second count in your complaint in which you seek injunctive relief with respect to anything that might be issued in the future. You're not asking me --

MR. BOUTROUS: Not today. If they come after us similarly again in the office and continue this pattern, then we need to come back before you.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. BOUTROUS: Your Honor, it is totally unprecedented for Congress to ever go after local prosecutors in any context and conduct oversight, totally.

THE COURT: I understand that, but it's also unprecedented for a local district attorney to bring a criminal indictment against a former President. Correct?

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1 MR. BOUTROUS: That's correct, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: So in connection with that, Mr. Berry has said Congress is exploring whether there is legislation that is 3 4 appropriate in order to protect people who serve in the office 5 of President, both while they're in office and after they 6 leave. 7 MR. BOUTROUS: Your Honor, two points on that. First of all, let's say that they really do want to 8 9 look at that, they just came up with this, like this is isn't 10 something they've been wrestling with. 11 THE COURT: But you just brought the indictment. 12 MR. BOUTROUS: Exactly. They're doing it to punish 13 and deter and --14 THE COURT: No, but --15 MR. BOUTROUS: Go ahead. THE COURT: You're asking me to assume that. They're 16 17 telling me they're doing it because the indictment raises, in their mind, legitimate concerns, which Congress has a right to 18 19 investigate to see whether there's legislation that's 20 appropriate. 21 MR. BOUTROUS: Let me accept that premise, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Yes. 23 MR. BOUTROUS: Why now? Why can't they do --24 THE COURT: But if you accept that premise, isn't that

the end of the inquiry?

MR. BOUTROUS: No, your Honor. I go back to *Mazars*. The Court asked about what happened in *Mazars*, and you were right. Chief Justice Roberts thought that there should be a hashing out --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BOUTROUS: In Mazars, the case went back to the D.C. Circuit, and far from immunity, the chairman of the committee at that point issued a 58-page explanation of the subpoena instead of press releases and tweets, and the D.C. went assiduously down. It didn't enjoin the subpoena, but it substantially narrowed it, and I think the chief justice and the court would be shocked if they thought they went through all that work in Mazars to create this test, which is -- I think Mr. Berry is understating its impact. It's a dramatic change in the scrutiny for subpoenas from Congress, that Congress could avoid it by simply seeking to just get out of the case or not intervening. That, I don't think, is what the Supreme Court intended. Why wouldn't they have had immunity in the Mazars case?

THE COURT: Why didn't you wait, then, for Congress to bring a case to enforce the subpoena? Wouldn't that take care of this problem?

MR. BOUTROUS: Well, they might have gone straight to contempt, your Honor, which it sounds like they're contemplating, and the Supreme Court --

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1 THE COURT: But what's your interest in that? 2 MR. BOUTROUS: Well, our information --THE COURT: You're not going to be held in contempt. 3 4 MR. BOUTROUS: That's true. 5 THE COURT: The subpoena's not addressed to you. It's addressed to Mr. Pomerantz. 6 7 MR. BOUTROUS: That's true, your Honor, but as you pointed out, Mr. Pomerantz is in -- New York authorities 8 9 enforcing New York law. 10 THE COURT: Are you representing Mr. Pomerantz? 11 MR. BOUTROUS: No. I'm going to point out why it's in 12 our interest, because he's in a space for contempt, and he 13 might decide, under those circumstances, to disclose 14 confidential information, deliberations information that 15 they're seeking, grand jury information. THE COURT: Does this book not reveal deliberation 16 17 information? You can't credibly say that it doesn't. 18 MR. BOUTROUS: We sought to stop it from happening. And that point I wanted to make, your Honor, this court has 19 20 found that it would have been a First Amendment prior 21 restraint. So that's why we didn't go running into court to 22 try to enjoin it. 23 THE COURT: No, but you also didn't, after 24 publication, take any steps -- in litigation anyway -- to try

to enjoin further distribution of the book.

MR. BOUTROUS: But the district attorney did and I believe is taking action to inquire into those matters, and so --

THE COURT: You didn't say any of that in your papers to me.

MR. BOUTROUS: I believe it's correct, your Honor, and I think I have one minute left.

(Indiscernible overlap)

MR. BOUTROUS: I want to stick to the time.

Two cases the Court asked me about -- vertical federalism and --

THE COURT: No, I didn't ask about vertical federalism. I asked isn't this federalism and not separation of powers.

MR. BOUTROUS: Excuse me. Vertical separation of powers. This is from the *LaRoque* case that we cited in our reply brief which talks about it.

And then, your Honor, on the federal funding, I just want to be very clear that the record is clear here in this case that the \$5,000 was used for the righteous prosecution that resulted in the conviction of the Trump Organization. It was not used in connection with the indictment and prosecution of President Trump that we're here talking about today.

THE COURT: That's not really before me, is it?

MR. BOUTROUS: I think it is, because Watkins and

other cases say where there's a flimsy connection between the subpoena and supposed legislative purpose, that's a ground for not enforcing it.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BOUTROUS: And again, I think the *Mazars* case makes very clear the Court can scrutinize, it can limit the subpoena, and therefore, we would ask you to do that. I know these are really thorny issues. I do think that the Supreme Court did not intend for Congress to avoid separation of powers issues, and the like, by invoking immunity. And *Eastland* says you can't do that.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. BOUTROUS: Can I make one procedural point, your Honor?

In the event the Court doesn't agree with us, we would like time to seek a stay and go to the Second Circuit.

THE COURT: Look, I don't know what you want me to do about time. That's why I'm holding you strictly to the time limits for oral argument here. It's 3 o'clock. You brought your application on when you did, which, by the way, you brought on improperly, without even serving the other side with the complaint, never mind with your motion. You did it ex parte. You didn't include the affidavit that our local rules require you to file. Then you filed the reply brief yesterday, which was not authorized by the scheduling order that I put in

place, which I concede was truncated, but that's because of the urgency here. So I can't do anything about the time. It is what it is.

MR. BOUTROUS: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: My intent is to wrap up the hearing momentarily and, as promptly as I can, get a decision published. And then you can seek whatever relief you want to seek, if you need it, or if the other side needs it.

MR. BOUTROUS: We do appreciate it. I just wanted,

I'm hereby giving notice. We did not intend to come in without
giving notice when we came. We were in the process of
notifying them.

THE COURT: But you did.

MR. BOUTROUS: We were in the process, but here we are, your Honor.

THE COURT: But you filed it, Mr. Boutrous. I mean, look, I don't want to waste a lot of time on this, but you're a very experienced litigator. Going into court ex parte seeking a TRO pursuant to a proposed order to show cause without providing notice is somewhat unusual, and our rules require an affidavit from you about the steps you took and why notice could not be given. And you didn't do that. So I don't want to belabor it, but that is how we got here.

MR. BOUTROUS: Understood, your Honor. And we will then just await your ruling and move promptly if we think we

need more relief.

THE COURT: Mr. Berry, I think you have three minutes.

MR. BERRY: Yes. I will not take more time than necessary, your Honor.

I just wanted to point out that in the letter that was sent to Chairman Jordan, the District Attorney's Office said --

THE COURT: Where is this? Is it in the record?

MR. BERRY: Yes. This is document 12-20, ECF document 12-20, on page 5 of that document.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. BERRY: It says, our review of the office's records reflect that of the federal forfeiture money that the office helped collect, approximately \$5,000 was spent on expenses incurred relating to the investigation of Donald J. Trump or the Trump Organization. It talks about when they were incurred, and then it says most of the costs were related to the Trump v. Vance case.

So I just want to point out that it is not accurate to say that this money was spent, all this money was spent on the prosecution of Mr. Weisselberg. As well, there's no dispute here that this has been an ongoing investigation for years, and if they spent \$5, if they spent \$5 million, Congress has the power of the purse. Congress has the right to investigate whether or not expenditures are appropriate, and in particular, here Congress has the right to try to investigate, given

everything that's going on with respect to investigations, is it appropriate going forward for federal funds to be used on the investigations and prosecutions of current and former Presidents and that this — the nature of this investigation is relevant to that inquiry.

THE COURT: But the testimony that you seek has to relate to that  $-\!\!\!\!-$ 

MR. BERRY: Yes.

THE COURT: -- let's assume it is a valid legislative purpose, does it not?

MR. BERRY: Absolutely.

THE COURT: How does Mr. Pomerantz's testimony relate in any way to these stated legislative purposes?

MR. BERRY: As someone who was intimately involved in this investigation, he can give us information in terms of whether or not this is the type of investigation upon which federal funds should be spent. And it doesn't matter how much money we're talking about; Congress has the power of the purse.

And with that, your Honor, that's all I have here to submit.

THE COURT: All right. Then I thank everybody very much for spirited oral arguments and really excellent briefing. I will get a decision published as promptly as I can.

We'll stand adjourned then, everyone. Thank you.
(Adjourned)